Too many cooks?

One advantage which a democracy has over a dictatorship is that the former can take the pulse of constituents when they air concerns, enabling it to promptly gauge the impact and effectiveness of policies and actions, and so make necessary adjustments.

Of course, the other side of the coin here is that the fact that sectors often voice out fears/gripes only when close to being pushed to the wall. But at least the alarm is raised.

This was the case when late last week 20 business, industry, labor, and civil society groups issued a joint statement asking Manila and Beijing to dial down confrontational statements involving “inflammatory rhetoric, public recriminations, and social media exchanges,” and called on our government to “pursue mutually beneficial economic opportunities through constructive engagement, while firmly upholding its sovereignty and national interests”¹. Their statement came in the wake of Foreign Affairs Secretary Ma. Theresa P. Lazaro’s Nov. 3 phone call with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi (at the former’s request, according to China’s ministry²), which our Foreign Affairs department (DFA) described as “frank, pragmatic and constructive” — diplospeak for a pointed exchange of views.

That was not the first time, mind you, that business groups have raised this concern, even as civil society groups like CitizenWatch, Konsyumer at Mamamayan, Democracy Watch and Bantay Consumer, Kuryente, Kalsada argued that economic cooperation and safeguarding the country’s maritime rights are not contradictory priorities, with CitizenWatch pushing for diversification of trade in order to reduce our over dependence on China.

The concern over deteriorating Philippine-China relations is understandable, considering that China (when coupled with Hong Kong, which is otherwise counted separately in the official national accounts data) is our biggest trade partner (though latest available data — September³ — show South Korea displacing China as our biggest source of merchandise imports) and a key market hosting overseas operations of major Philippine firms, as well as about 200,000 Filipinos (working in the mainland, Hong Kong, and Macau).

It is unfortunate that this government risks ending its six-year term in mid-2028 with little to show in our country’s relations with the second-biggest economy in the world — although its predecessor could not boast of any compelling, lasting benefit either (e.g., whether in terms of trade, investments, tourism, pledged economic assistance, or even just Filipino fishermen’s unhindered access to their traditional catch areas) for bending over backward to accommodate Beijing’s sensitivities during its time.

Except, of course, that we have widened awareness among many countries about Beijing’s designs on the South China Sea (by the way, who else, besides China, recognizes the nine-/10-dash line there?), who — whether on their own or in joint patrols and maneuvers with us — helped implement the 2016 arbitral ruling which China (and no one else) has rejected.

Whatever else transpired in last week’s Lazaro-Wang call beyond details which both sides have so far cared to disclose to the public, any such high-level dialogue is preferred to having none at all.

… SPOIL THE BROTH
Having said that, one hopes that this administration does not leave Philippine-China relations where they are now when it steps down, and has a game plan for at least giving its successor in 2028 a good foundation on which to mend torn bilateral ties and rebuild from there.

To be sure, one should not hope for an immediate cessation of tensions in the West Philippine Sea (WPS) to accompany any improvement in bilateral ties. Note that signs of India-China rapprochement that emerged in 2024 after a four-year diplomatic freeze have still been occasionally accompanied by border clashes (the latest round of which began in July and simmer to this day) that have left scores of their troops wounded. Vietnam — which has actually been an active “island” builder in the South China Sea without much Chinese interference — has had its own tale to tell in learning to deal with its giant of a northern neighbor across their border after their last maritime clash in 1988-1989. I should think that we have already been exchanging notes with Indian and Vietnamese foreign, defense, and trade experts in order to learn from their experiences.

If anything, 2027 should be the year when the Marcos administration lays the groundwork/right conditions for our own rapprochement with China from 2028 onwards.

Where does one start? By checking where we could meet China midway without compromising our own “red lines,” especially in our exclusive economic zone (EEZ), while at the same time sharpening our own messaging with Beijing by making it more unified.

The Chinese Foreign Ministry’s latest statement reads like a unilateral list of demands which the Philippines should meet if it wants relations to improve, and is silent on what China itself can do to serve this end.

Topping the list is the demand to muzzle “[a] handful of Philippine politicians, driven by political bias and selfish gains, [who] have repeatedly attacked and smeared China, crossed China’s red lines, politicized normal economic, trade, people to people and cultural exchanges, and infringed upon the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese nationals and institutions in the Philippines.”

The immediate reflex after reading such a statement would be to chide Beijing for thinking that it can just throw its weight around and expect other countries to comply — before handing out mere candy to those found compliant (as it did the past administration). Since Beijing is surely aware of how democracies work — at least in principle — this smacks of sheer arrogance on the back of its economic and military might.

Having said that, perhaps it is time for the Executive branch to have just one talking head in the tortuous, delicate path to bilateral rapprochement in a couple of years. Each department has its core function and mission, with foreign policy belonging to the DFA and, of course, ultimately, to Malacañang. While other departments such as Defense and Trade are considered generally part of the wider foreign policy sector (which could also embrace business interest groups and the academe in a wider grouping), they do have unique roles to play.

Even from a simple communication standpoint, it is easier to understand (and avoid misunderstandings) and deal with a party that speaks with one voice. Hence, while our articulate Defense chief and Coast Guard spokesman for the West Philippine Sea have backed up our steadfast stance in our EEZ, showing that we are not pushovers, it is time to stop sending mixed signals in dealing with Beijing. Let the DFA and Malacañang do the talking from here on in on anything pertaining to Philippine-China relations.

Allowing the defense sector (loosely, including the coast guard which otherwise falls under the Transport department) to speak on this matter could run the risk of couching it in the context of armed confrontation, which is a prospect that both sides hope to avoid.

OUR SLIP IS SHOWING
At the same time, everyone in the foreign policy sector should be on the same page regarding objectives and next steps in dealing with Beijing.

One unfortunately still hears of debilitating turf wars and compartmentalization in this sector, with one party not knowing what others are doing. Signs of just such a turf war flared into the open when the DFA (which, I have heard, has its own internal high-level rifts) issued a Nov. 9 press release that scored unnamed “certain government officials” for their criticism of China, saying that “[p]ersonal advocacies must never serve interests other than the national interest”⁴. Sooo… they assume that personal — rather than national — interests primarily drive those speaking against China’s aggression (yes, we have all seen social media posts pushing the Defense chief to consider the presidency in 2028, but to apparently hint at that in an official statement to be picked up by media is another matter altogether — and what about all other officials who criticize Beijing)?

“They risk eroding the country’s credibility in international affairs and project an image of internal division that external parties can exploit.”

Correct. So, why air such dirty linen in public, instead of fixing divisions discreetly? What was the point of that unusual press statement that could not be advanced better behind closed doors? Because now I can just imagine Beijing’s strategists plotting with glee on how to exploit this overt rift between the front-line foreign affairs and defense sectors.

This prerequisite is so vital and the interdepartmental turf war so acute that it may take no less than the president this time to step in to settle their quarrel and force productive cooperation.

GAME PLAN
Hence, there should be just one foreign policy voice in the Executive branch. But that one voice should be the result of constant, extensive consultations with all other departments with a say in ties with China.

Corollary to having one voice, is to draw up — again as a result of consultations with the Defense, Trade, and other departments, as well as private sector experts — a game plan, complete with a menu of things to offer China in exchange for its own concessions. For example: Beijing is hurting from our highly effective “transparency initiative” whereby we document and publicize cases of Chinese maritime aggression? We can offer to suspend that, provided they — including their maritime militia — stop encroaching on our EEZ (even if they have built artificial islands there) and refrain from harassing our fishermen. They want us to suspend joint WPS patrols with other countries? What can they offer in return? And so on. Failure to live up to commitments risk reviving those Philippine initiatives.

Of course, the road to rapprochement is going to be tricky as election campaigns heat up next year, what with the WPS tensions and the suspected collusion of a few political leaders with Beijing expected to gain greater prominence in public fora.

And as we take these immediate steps to hopefully put our relations with China back on track, it is just as vital that we persevere in boosting our overall strategic resilience and agility by further diversifying trade (hopefully, South Korea’s supplanting of China as our top import source in September was a sign of that), further easing the cost of doing business in order to attract more foreign direct investments, making a significant dent on graft and corruption in order to make sure that public funds truly go to projects that will support economic activity and reduce poverty, modernizing our armed forces to build a credible deterrence capability, upgrading our human capital (through better healthcare and education), updating our 85-year-old anti-espionage law (Commonwealth Act No. 616), etc.

¹ https://tinyurl.com/2834hwz9

https://tinyurl.com/2yblotgl

² https://tinyurl.com/2dp24cdm

³ https://tinyurl.com/22zdt9wk

⁴ https://tinyurl.com/28qwhmzx

https://tinyurl.com/278x6pev

Wilfredo G. Reyes was editor-in-chief of BusinessWorld from 2020 through 2023.